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Set-point theory has dominated the field of subjective well-being (SWB). It has served 
as a classic Kuhn research paradigm, being extended and refined for thirty years to 
take in new results. The central plank of the theory is that adult set-points do not 
change, except just temporarily in the face of major life events. There was always 
some ‘discordant data’, including evidence that some events are so tragic (e.g. the 
death of one’s child) that people never recover back to their set-point. It was possible 
to dismiss these events as ‘exceptions’ and maintain the theory. However, several new 
findings are now emerging, which it is increasingly difficult to dismiss as ‘exceptions’ 
and which appear to require substantial revisions or replacement of set-point theory. 
Many of these findings are based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Survey (SOEP, 1984 - ) which provides clear evidence of large, long term changes in 
the set-points of substantial minorities of the population.  
 
This paper reviews recent findings and highlights lines of theory development which, 
at minimum, represent substantial revisions to set-point theory and which may 
perhaps lead to replacement of the paradigm. There is evidence to suggest that 
individuals with certain personality traits are more likely to record long term change 
in SWB than others. Also, SWB appears to depend partly on choice/prioritisation of 
some life goals rather than others. Pursuit of non-zero sum goals (family and altruistic 
goals) leads to higher SWB than pursuit of zero sum goals (career advancement and 
material gains). Both these new lines of theory appear promising and the second, in 
particular, cannot sensibly be reconciled with set-point theory.  
   3
Introduction 
 
The set-point theory of SWB, under various confusing and changing labels, has 
dominated the field for 30 years.  It has become the paradigm theory (Kuhn, 1962) of 
SWB research. One motivation for this paper is to give reasons for believing that the 
theory needs serious revision and perhaps replacement. Perhaps we need - or are on 
the brink of - a scientific revolution. So a second aim of the paper is to give some 
indications about alternative theories which may be emerging to replace set-point 
theory.  
 
Let me flag immediately why set-point theory is in trouble.  Its central proposition is 
that adult individuals have differing but stable levels of SWB; levels substantially due 
to personality traits and other factors which are partly hereditary or determined early 
in life. Adult SWB is not supposed to change. Major life events can cause deviations 
from the set-point but their effects are usually transitory and, after a period of 
‘deviation’, people return to their previous set-points.  
 
The key challenge to set-point theory comes from evidence in the German Socio-
Economic Panel (Wagner, Frick and Schupp, 2007).  The panel has run for over 20 
years and provides the first longitudinal data set which enables us directly to test the 
central proposition of the theory, namely that adult SWB really is stable.
1 The SOEP 
data show that close to 20% of a national representative sample have recorded 
substantial and apparently more or less permanent changes in their life satisfaction 
during the last 20 years. About 6% recorded gains of 2 or more points (close to 1.5 
standard deviations) on a 0-10 life satisfaction scale, and more than twice that number 
– about 13% - recorded substantial and apparently permanent declines. Changes of 
this magnitude recorded by close to one fifth of a national sample are really not 
compatible with set-point theory as currently understood. What is more these changes 
                                                 
1 We all have Wolfgang Zapf to thank for insisting that SOEP, at its inception, should include measures 
of life satisfaction and domain satisfactions (Wagner, 2007).   4
have occurred in peacetime and during a period in which there has been no serious 
economic slump.  
 
One final introductory point – or really an editorial point.  Perhaps nobody shed tears 
over set-point theory. Arguably, it is stultifying. From a research standpoint, it implies 
that once we have identified the stabilising characteristics which keep people close to 
or returning to their set-points, there is not much more to be done. It also implies – 
depressingly - that it is very unlikely that adults, and especially older people, can 
become happier or do anything much to improve their own happiness.  Nor can 
Governments help. So if set-point theory is overturned, that will be good for 
researchers, and possibly even for the human race. It will open up the whole field of 
SWB research again, and lead to a search for the causes of long term change and 
improvement in SWB. 
 
History of a paradigm: why set-point theory looked so 
convincing and became so dominant 
Set-point theory has appeared so convincing because it developed in a cumulative 
fashion with layer on layer of evidence supporting it and making it seem more 
compelling in its account of links among three sets of variables: stable person 
characteristics including personality traits, life events and measures of well-being (life 
satisfaction, positive affect) and ill-being (anxiety, depression and stress).  
 
The cumulativeness of development has been somewhat disguised – perhaps heavily 
disguised - by the propensity of researchers to give new labels to revised versions or 
extensions of previous theory. In particular, it should be noted that at least five other 
labels have been used to describe what has developed into and is now generally 
known as set-point theory: adaptation level (AL) theory, personality theory, dynamic 
equilibrium theory, multiple discrepancies theory and homeostatic theory. 
 
Brickman and Campbell (1971) initiated developments by proposing an adaptation-
level (AL) theory of well-being. They observed that most individuals returned to 
‘baseline’ (later termed ‘equilibrium level’ or ‘set-point’), even after what would   5
previously have been thought of as life changing events.  The sentence ‘we are all on 
an hedonic treadmill’ summarised the findings of their research. Brickman, Coates 
and Janoff-Bulman (1978) claimed that the hedonic treadmill concept still applied 
even in the case of people who became paraplegics or won large sums in a lottery, 
although their evidence is open to serious objections (see below).   
 
Not long after Brickman and Campbell first proposed an AL theory of SWB, Richard 
A. Easterlin (1974) claimed that it worked beautifully in the economic domain of life.  
The famous Easterlin Paradox says that economic growth does not improve the 
human lot – or at least does not increase happiness – because people adapt completely 
to improved fortunes, if everyone around them is going about equally well.  (The 
second part of the Paradox is that people just feel slightly happier if they are relatively 
well off compared with others in their own society). 
 
The next major development came when Costa and McCrae (1980) proposed a 
personality theory of SWB. They showed that individuals have differing SWB 
baselines or set-points partly due to differences in scores on the stable personality 
traits of extroversion (E) and neuroticism (N). Extroverts rated higher on SWB than 
introverts and relatively neurotic people rated lower than emotionally stable 
individuals.  
 
Headey and Wearing (1989, 1992) sought to extend SWB theory by linking 
personality, life events and SWB in what they termed dynamic equilibrium theory. 
Using data from an Australian panel study, they observed that history repeats itself in 
people’s lives, that the same life events tend to keep happening to the same people. It 
was inferred that events must be partly endogenous, and not as previously supposed 
entirely exogenous. That is, the events which happen to a person must be partly driven 
by his/her stable characteristics. It was shown that extroverts tend to experience many 
positive events and that neurotic individuals experience many negative events (see 
also Magnus et al, 1993).
2 Further, extroverts tend to magnify the impact of positive 
                                                 
2 Magnus et al (1993) replicated Headey and Wearing’s (1989) results and confirmed that personality 
affects reports of relatively objective events (e.g. got married, became unemployed) and not just events 
which could be a matter of selective perception.    6
events, extracting greater satisfaction from them than others (Lucas and Baird, 2004).  
Similarly, neurotic people magnify the impact of adverse events (Larsen, 1992). 
People who rate high on both E and N – recall that the two traits are uncorrelated – 
experience many events of both kinds, and people who rate low on both E and N 
experience few events of both kinds. The personality trait of openness to experience 
(O) is also implicated. People who rate high on O report many positive and many 
negative events, while people who rate low on O report few events of either kind 
(Headey and Wearing, 1989). However, O is not normally found to be directly related 
to SWB.  
 
A key implication of Headey and Wearing’s results is that, provided only a person’s 
normal or predictable pattern of life events happens in any given time period, then 
SWB will not change. A person’s SWB changes only when events occur which are 
abnormal for him or her. Another implication is that if one knows three things about a 
person – his/her levels of E, N and O – then one can fairly well predict the sorts of 
events which will keep on happening to him/her.  This pattern of results led Headey 
and Wearing to refer to ‘equilibrium levels’ of well-being and ill-being (rather than 
‘baselines’ or ‘set-points’) and to conceive of personality, life events, well-being and 
ill-being as being in dynamic equilibrium.  
 
Some researchers have downplayed the significance of individual differences in SWB 
and focused on the fact that the very large majority of people in countries all over the 
world report levels of SWB well above scale mid-points (i.e. more ‘satisfied’ than 
‘dissatisfied’).  Multiple discrepancies theory (Michalos, 1985) and homeostatic 
theory (Cummins, 1995) are concerned with explaining this outcome and describing 
the mechanisms which keep it in place. 
 
Lykken and Tellegen (1996) then developed what they termed the set-point theory of 
SWB. This too accounted for linkages between stable person characteristics, life 
events and SWB.  Because their research was based on twin studies, they were able to 
show that heredity more generally, and not just the specific personality traits of E and 
N, was strongly related to SWB.  In successive papers, using somewhat different 
approaches, they have claimed that genetic factors account for about 50% of the 
variance in SWB (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996), or perhaps close to 100% (Lykken,   7
1999, 2000).  This last estimate plainly leads to the conclusion that SWB is more or 
less fixed for life and that neither individual efforts nor public policy can do much to 
enhance it.    
 
Discordant evidence – first cracks in the theory  
Even before set-point theory began to be questioned, there was some discordant 
evidence. It was clear that some life events are so adverse, so tragic that victims never 
recover back to their previous set-point.  One such event is the unexpected death of a 
child (Wortman and Silver, 1987).  It was easy to dismiss such unusual tragic events 
as ‘rare exceptions’ which did not require revision of the theory. 
 
More difficult from the point of view of the theory, is Clark et al’s (2004) evidence 
about repeated spells of unemployment. They show that repeated spells - although not 
a single spell - have a ‘scarring effect’ from which most people do not fully recover. 
Again it is possible to dismiss repeated unemployment as ‘exceptional’ (although it is 
not all that uncommon).  More difficult is evidence about the potentially beneficial 
effects of marriage.  Lucas et al (2003) showed that some people, although not most, 
achieve long-lasting and perhaps permanent gains in SWB as a result of getting 
married (see also Gottman, 1996).  Researchers trying to salvage set-point theory 
could hardly claim that getting married is an exceptional event. 
 
Entertainingly, another positive life event which has been shown to raise the SWB 
set-point is cosmetic surgery (Wengle, 1986; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999).  
Cosmetic surgery is not all that uncommon either, especially in Los Angeles and 
Brazil.  
 
The cracks widen – Easterlin does a U-turn 
Easterlin (2005) appears to be the first to tackle set-point theory head-on and claim 
that it is seriously in error. In a recent review article he makes a sharp distinction 
between the economic domain of life and non-economic domains.  As we saw earlier,    8
his previous work gave key support to AL theory by showing that people completely 
adapt to gains in the economic domain, so that even big financial gains have little or 
no impact on SWB.  He now reviews research relating to family life and health, 
concluding that in these domains complete adaptation does not occur, although partial 
adaptation does. In the family domain, he notes Lucas et al’s (2003) research showing 
that some people who get married and stay married are sometimes happier in the long 
term. He adds the well known point that people who separate or who remain single 
are generally unhappier than partnered people.
3  
 
The evidence Easterlin adduces about the health domain is perhaps stronger. He cites 
a major North American survey, based on a national representative sample, which 
shows that people who become seriously disabled or have painful chronic conditions 
like rheumatoid arthritis have permanently lower levels of SWB than otherwise 
similar people who are not disabled (Mehnert et al, 1990).  In the light of this 
research, Easterlin suggests that it is time for SWB researchers to stop relying on 
Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman’s (1978) results, cited earlier, relating to 
paraplegics.  The difference in SWB found by these researchers between paraplegics 
and controls was in fact statistically significant, although the authors regarded it as 
‘surprisingly small’.
4      
 
Easterlin’s opinion, derived from his review, is that individuals would be wise to 
allocate more time to the family and health domains, and less to the economic 
domain. In coming to this conclusion he echoes previous economists who have also 
questioned the priority which Governments and individuals appear to give to the 
economic domain (Scitovsky, 1976; Hirsch, 1976; Ng, 1978; Frank, 1985; see also 
Lane, 2000; Thoits and Hewitt, 2001;  Nickerson et al, 2003).   
 
Huppert (2005) has also contributed a review article seriously questioning set-point 
theory. Drawing on the classic mood research of Wessman and Ricks (1966; see also 
                                                 
3 This causation has always been open to dispute. People who separate and remain separated, or who 
are always single, almost certainly have different ‘starting’ characteristics and tastes from people who 
remain married. 
4 Their N was just 29.   9
Davidson, 1992, 2002), she proposes that some people have higher emotional 
reactivity than others and that, if such people are exposed to either particularly 
favourable or particularly adverse life events, their set-points may change. However, 
as she notes, these ideas are extrapolations from laboratory research and are not based 
on representative population samples. 
 
Huppert is also critical of Lykken’s (2000) estimate that close to 100% of the variance 
in SWB could be due to genetic factors.  This estimate depends on 9-year correlations 
of SWB recorded by twins.  The total sample of twins recorded a 9-year correlation of 
0.55.  This is about the level of correlation that SWB researchers would expect over a 
9-year period and would not seem to be decisive as confirmatory or falsificatory 
evidence in regard to set-point theory. The key finding in Lykken’s view is that, 
within the sub-set of identical (MZ) twins, the scores of one twin at time 1 predicted 
the scores of his/her other twin nine years later almost as well as it predicted his/her 
own score (r=0.54 as compared to r=0.55).  Since 0.54/0.55 is nearly 100%, this is 
what leads Lykken to conclude that, in relation to what he calls ‘the stable component 
of well-being’… nearly 100% of the variation across people in the happiness set-point 
seems to be due to differences in genetic make-up!’  
 
Huppert points out that this interpretation is dubious. If, instead of stressing the point 
which Lykken seizes on, one chose to emphasise the over-time correlations between 
scores of the same individuals – surely central to set-point theory – then one would 
conclude that scores at time 1 are only a moderately good predictor of scores nine 
years later, whether one uses the scores of twin 1 or twin 2.  An even more 
fundamental point, in Huppert’s view, is that it is mistaken to assume that individuals 
with the same genes are bound to experience the same levels of SWB.
5  The same 
genes can express themselves (be turned on or turned off), depending on different life 
experiences, especially but not exclusively early childhood experiences (Huppert, 
2005). 
 
                                                 
5 This point is noted by Lykken (2000) but has been ignored by many other investigators in their 
commentaries on set-point theory.   10
Citing the German SOEP results mentioned in the introduction to this paper,  Fujita 
and Diener (2005) focussed on specific events associated with change, notably getting 
married, becoming widowed and becoming unemployed.  Going beyond this, Diener, 
Lucas and Scollon (2006) recently published a review article on adaptation theory as 
advanced by Brickman and Campbell (1971).  They made five main criticisms of the 
theory and suggested some revisions which would also apply to set-point theory as it 
is currently understood.  In particular, they noted that evidence of medium and long 
term change in set-points needed to be incorporated into any revised theory (see also 
Scollon and Diener, 2006).  
 
Substantial amendments to set-point theory – going beyond 
references to ‘exceptional events’  
The next key step in theory development is to try and go beyond patching up set-point 
theory by reference to ‘exceptional events’ and see if the theory  can be constructively 
revised, or even replaced by a theory which offers systematic explanations of why 
substantial numbers of individuals record long term changes in SWB.  In taking some 
preliminary steps, SOEP data are used to modify theory in two ways: 
 
(1) by showing that the personality traits of some individuals make them significantly 
more likely than others to record long term change in SWB, and (2) by showing that 
choice of life goals/life priorities is systematically related to differences in SWB and 
to changes in SWB over time.    
 
The probability of major long term changes in SWB is 
predictable on the basis of personality traits E and N 
In recent papers, using the German panel data, the present author has sought to revise 
set-point theory by attempting to explain why substantial minorities record long term 
change in SWB, even though the majority do not (Headey, 2006ab; Headey, in press).  
One new result, which really just comes from extending a previous line of thought, is 
that the people most likely to record large changes in life satisfaction are those who   11
score high on the personality traits of extroversion (E), or neuroticism (N), or both.  
Trait O (openness to experience) may also be involved, but analyses including O will 
be postponed until later (see Table 2). 
 
As noted, it is clear that people who score high on E actually experience more positive 
life events than other people, and that people who rate high on N record more adverse 
events (Headey and Wearing, 1989, 1992; Magnus et al, 1993). So people who score 
high on either trait – and, even more, people who score high on both - ‘roll the dice’ 
more often than others. It is reasonable to hypothesise that they have a higher than 
average risk/probability that some event or combination of events will occur which 
could lead them to experience long term change in SWB.  The extroverts have a high 
‘upside risk’ of large gains in life satisfaction; they roll the dice with a positive bias.  
Neurotic people have a high ‘downside risk’ of large losses; they roll the dice with a 
negative bias. People who are both extroverted and neurotic may have a high risk of 
significant change in either direction (but see below). 
 
Table 1 shows key evidence testing these hypotheses (Headey, 2006b). The sample 
comprises 2872 West German and immigrant (‘guest-worker’) respondents who 
participated in SOEP every year in 1985-2005.  The outcome variable is differences in 
individuals’ satisfaction scores in the five-year period 2000-04 compared with 1985-
89.  Satisfactions scores were averaged over five years precisely to capture long term 
rather than transitory changes.  
 
Life satisfaction is measured on a single item 0-10 scale where 0 means ‘completely 
dissatisfied’ and 10 means ‘completely satisfied’.  The personality traits are measured 
on 1-7 scales. The key relationships in the equations reported in Table 1 are of course 
between personality traits and changes in life satisfaction.
6  However, note that 
gender, age and its quadratic term, and life satisfaction in 1985-89 are also included, 
essentially as ‘controls’. The reason for including the lagged measure of life 
satisfaction is that, as SWB researchers are well aware, there is invariably a large 
                                                 
6 Note that in SOEP personality traits E, N and O were not measured until 2005.  Assuming that adult 
personality is pretty stable, the date of measurement should not affect results. This particularly applies 
to results for prime age individuals shown in the final column of Table 1.   12
negative correlation between life satisfaction at baseline and changes between 
baseline and some later date. This type of ‘regression-to-the-mean’ is dealt with by 
including the baseline measure on the right side of equations, and much improves 
their statistical fit.  
 
Table 1 reports OLS regressions for the total sample, then for men and women 
separately, and then for prime age adults (30-64) whose SWB, according to set-point 
theory, is least likely to change.   
 
Table 1 
Long Term Change in Life Satisfaction: Upside and Downside Risks: OLS 
regressions (metric coefficients)  
 
  Outcome variable: change in life satisfaction  
LS2000-04 - LS1985-89 
 All  Men  Women  Age  30-64 
E          0.14***         0.12***       0.16***        0.12*** 
N         -0.24***        -0.25***       -0.23***       -0.24*** 
Female 0.03  - - 0.10 
Age 0.01  0.00  0.02  0.02 
Age
2  -0.00  0.00  -0.00          -0.00 
LS1985-89  -0.55***  -0.55***  -0.54***      -0.55*** 
R
2 28.5%  27.8%  29.0%  27.8% 
Sample 2872  1364  1508  1002 
Source: SOEP 1985-2005. Sample: balanced panel of respondents aged 16 and over.  
***significant at 0.001     
 
In interpreting the evidence in this table, recall that 6% of the sample recorded gains 
in life satisfaction of 2 or more points (close to 1.5 standard deviations) and that 13% 
recorded declines of the same magnitude. The evidence clearly indicates that the more 
extroverted the individual, the larger was his/her gain in life satisfaction in the twenty 
year period 1985-2004. The more neurotic the individual, the larger was his/her   13
decline in satisfaction. It might perhaps be inferred that those who were both 
relatively extroverted and relatively neurotic were at exceptionally high risk of 
change, but in what direction is not immediately clear (but see Table 2 below).  
 
Note, however, that the modest coefficients for E and N in Table 1 could be said to be 
compatible with a watered-down version of set-point theory, which could be revised 
to say that most people’s set-points do not change, and are not liable to do so if they 
score near the mean on both E and N.   
 
Can the analysis be extended to include the Openness (O) 
trait?  
Personality trait O is usually found to be uncorrelated with SWB
7 but is associated 
with experiencing both more favourable life events and more adverse events (Headey 
and Wearing, 1989; Magnus et al, 1993).  So high O scorers also ‘roll the dice’ more 
often than average. A minority of them might be expected (like a minority of high E 
and high N scorers) to record substantial changes in SWB over a 20 year period. 
However, since O is itself uncorrelated with SWB, logic would suggest that it can 
only affect outcomes in combination with E or with N.  People who score high on 
both E and O  may be hypothesised to have an especially high upside risk of gains in 
SWB, while those score high on N and O may have an unusually high downside risk 
of declines in SWB.  
 
How to translate these ideas into appropriate equations?  The usual approach is to 
construct interaction terms. The term E*O may capture the combined effect of 
extroversion and openness, and the term N*O may capture the combination of 
neuroticism and openness.  But it is notorious, at least when dealing with survey data, 
that equations which include both main effects (E, N) and interaction terms (E*O, 
N*O) often yield counter-intuitive results (e.g. coefficients with the ‘wrong’ signs), 
                                                 
7 In the SOEP file there was a small positive correlation between O and life satisfaction in 2005. This 
should probably be regarded as an aberrant result.  Also, there was a moderate correlation between E 
and O, which in principle should be orthogonal.   14
and results which are unstable in that they do not stand up to minor variations in 
specification.  Further, they rarely replicate in new data sets.  In part, as is well 
known, this may be due to high levels of collinearity between main effects and 
interaction terms.  
 
The analyses attempted here plainly suffered from these types of problems.  When 
equations were run which included both main effects and interaction terms, the signs 
of the interaction terms were, in several cases, contrary to hypothesis. The results 
made no sense in terms of any plausible theory.  However, when main effects were 
omitted, and only interaction terms included, more plausible results were found  
(Table 2).    
Table 2 
Upside and Downside Risk of Long Term Change in Life Satisfaction: OLS 
equations with interaction terms 
  Outcome variable: change in life satisfaction  
LS2000-04 - LS1985-89 
  
  Eq 2.1  Eq 2.2  Eq 2.3 
E         0.20***  -  - 
N       -0.42***  -  - 
E*O        -0.16**        0.24***        0.25*** 
N*O        0.30***       -0.27***       -0.20*** 
E*N  -  -       -0.10** 
Female 0.04  -0.01  0.01 
Age 0.01  0.01  0.01 
Age
2 -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
LS1985-89 -0.54***  -0.53***  -0.54*** 
R
2 29.0%  26.8%  27.1% 
Source: SOEP 1985-2005. Sample: balanced panel of respondents aged 16 and over.  
Sample size=2843. The interaction terms have been constructed to run from 1 to 7, as do the 
scales for E, N and O. 
***significant at 0.001   **significant at 0.01 
   15
Equation 2.1 (first column of results) just exposes the problems which arise when 
interaction terms are included. The sign for E*O was expected to be positive but 
turned out negative, while N*O should have been negative but turned out positive.  
These results, which surely have to be rejected as aberrant, are almost certainly due to 
multicollinearity; the correlation between E and E*O is 0.82, and the correlation 
between N and N*O is 0.66. 
 
Equations 2.2 and 2.3 yield apparently more sensible and interpretable results. Here 
the main effects of E and N have been omitted, and personality traits are included 
only as interaction terms. It could be argued that, although this is contrary to standard 
practice, it does directly test the hypotheses that are being put forward.  Recall that the 
hypotheses propose that (1) individuals with a high probability of gains in SWB are 
those who score high on both E and O, and (2) those at great risk of decline in SWB 
are high scorers on both N and O.  Equation 2.2 perhaps offers a little support for 
these two conjectures, but it should be noted that the overall fit of the equation 
(adjusted R
2=0.268) is a bit worse than the Table 1 equation which included only 
main effects (adjusted R
2=0.285). 
 
Equation 2.3 in Table 2 is even more speculative. It adds another interaction term, 
namely E*N.  Individuals who score high on both E and N are notorious types; they 
tend to be heavy smokers, heavy drinkers, and disproportionately criminals (Eysenck 
and Eysenck, 1969).  They are certainly risk-takers, and perhaps we might expect 
their SWB to be more likely to decline rather than increase over time.  The small but 
significantly negative coefficient for E*N could be taken to suggest that this is what 
happens. Again, however, it has to be conceded that the fit of this equation (adjusted 
R
2=0.271) is worse than for the Table 1 main effects equation.  
 
Alternative specifications were tried, using dummy variables for sub-groups of E*O 
and N*O, but again results were unconvincing. Some were plausible, some were 
counter-intuitive, and they were unstable in the face of minor variations in variable 
construction and equation specification. 
 
Overall, it certainly cannot at this stage be claimed that the SOEP panel results 
indicate that O is implicated in changes in life satisfaction. This is perhaps somewhat   16
surprising, given the evidence that O increases exposure to major life events.  It may 
be that subsequent research will implicate O, but for the moment the inquiry has led 
nowhere.   
 
The asymmetry of change: why do more people show large 
declines in SWB than show large gains? 
It has been mentioned that more than twice as many respondents in the SOEP panel 
recorded large declines in life satisfaction as recorded large gains. This asymmetry of 
change is a finding of potential interest. The asymmetry occurred in the context of 
only a very small decline in average satisfaction for the total sample in this long 
period – from 7.2 on the 0-10 scale in 1985-89 to 7.0 in 2000-04.  In other words, the 
relatively large numbers who became substantially less satisfied were more or less  
counterbalanced in the total population by somewhat larger numbers who became 
slightly more satisfied, leaving the national mean little changed. 
 
It is certainly possible that the asymmetry will not replicate in other panels.  It could 
even be due to sample bias – respondents who have remained in SOEP for two 
decades are plainly a highly self-selected group – but, in general, survey researchers 
would tend to expect people who were becoming less happy to drop out of a panel at a 
greater rate than people who were becoming happier, and not the other way round.   
 
If the asymmetry is ‘real’ and not just a measurement artifact, and if it replicates in 
other panels, we will need to ask why it is harder to become substantially more 
satisfied with life than it is to suffer a serious decline. An explanation offered by 
Selye (1950) may hold, although in this context it is highly speculative. Selye, the 
psychologist who first developed stress theory in the 1930s, showed that all major life 
events, even putatively favourable ones (e.g. getting married; getting promoted at 
work) are stressful and increase the risk of mental and physical health problems. So 
Selye would perhaps not be surprised by the life satisfaction results reported here. He 
might say that favourable events and experiences may result in some gain in   17
happiness, but at the cost of some stress, whereas adverse events (e.g. the death of a 
family member; being sacked) are unambiguously stressful.
8  
 
Choice of life goals/priorities matters to life satisfaction 
Another new finding, which if correct punches a larger hole in set-point theory, is that 
choice of life goals appears to matter to happiness/life satisfaction (Headey, 2007, in 
press).  Clearly, it is quite contrary to the whole thrust of set-point theory to think that 
a person can improve his/her SWB by sensible choice of life goals. 
 
Think back to Easterlin’s (2005) review of the literature on the family life and health. 
One inference he drew was that people would be happier if they prioritised these 
domains and not the economic domain. In thinking how to test Easterlin’s idea,  it 
seemed sensible to reformulate it in order to try and make it more general and more 
explanatory. Why might it be better for happiness to focus on some domains rather 
than others?  Perhaps the key distinction lies between zero sum and non-zero sum 
domains of life. Zero sum domains are competitive – one person’s gain is unavoidably 
another person’s loss – whereas non-zero sum or positive sum domains are those in 
which ‘my gain can also promote your gain’.  The economic domain, and domains 
where status is involved, are by and large zero sum.  Family life, health and many 
community and volunteer activities are, by contrast, more or less non zero sum or 
positive sum domains.  
 
The German SOEP panel also provides data which enable us to provide a limited test 
of these ideas. SOEP has used a classification of life goals   initially developed by 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961).  The instrument set out to measure three sets of 
goals:  
•  success: career success and material gains 
•  family life: happy marriage, children 
                                                 
8 It is also likely that the longer the panel runs, the more respondents are in the last two or three years of 
life, at which stage life satisfaction declines (‘terminal decline’).  Thanks to Gert G. Wagner for 
drawing attention to this point.     18
•  altruism: friendship, helping others, social and political activism. 
 
Clearly success goals may be viewed as predominantly zero sum, whereas family 
goals and altruistic goals are predominantly non-zero sum or positive sum. 
 
Table 3 shows how choice of life goals relates to life satisfaction (Headey, 2006c). In 
doing the analysis, variables which might reasonably be thought of as antecedent to or 
conterminous with life goals were ‘controlled’. These included gender, age and its 
quadratic, personality traits, marital status, education, income and health.   
Table 3 




Outcome variable: Life Satisfaction 2004 (0-10) 
 
Success goals  -0.08*    -0.09* 
Family goals  0.32***     0.26*** 
Altruistic goals  0.18***     0.16*** 
Gender 0.02      0.05 
Age -0.05***    -0.06*** 
Age squared/10  0.01***     0.01*** 
Extraversion 0.10***      0.09*** 
Neuroticism -0.26***    -0.25*** 
Internal locus  0.47***     0.42*** 
Partnered (1-0)       0.23*** 
Years of education        -0.00 
HH disposable income/1000      0.02*** 
Health disability (1-0)       -0.60*** 
Sample size  8271    8026 
Adj. R squared  13.1%    15.8% 
*** significant at 0.001   *significant at 0.05  
 
The evidence indicates that success goals – zero sum goals – are slightly negatively 
related to life satisfaction (net of all other variables in the equation), while non zero 
sum goals are significantly and quite strongly positively related.  Further analysis (not   19
shown here) indicated that respondents who had persistently over fifteen years 
pursued (or reported pursuing) non zero-sum goals recorded gains in life satisfaction, 
whereas those who persistently pursued zero sum goals recorded declines (Headey, 
2006c, 2007 in press). 
Where are we now? Possible new lines of theory 
What would a worthwhile new theory of SWB look like?  Arguably, it would at 
minimum have to give a sensible account of linkages among four sets of variables: 
person characteristics (including personality traits), life goals/priorities, life events, 
and measures of well-being and ill-being.  In the recent past, SWB researchers have 
tended to specialise in the study of well-being, but this is one-eyed. Well-being (life 
satisfaction, positive affects) and ill-being (anxiety, depression and stress) need 
including in the same explanatory framework.  That is, we need to understand the 
partly overlapping and partly different correlates and causes of well-being and ill-
being, rather than putting them in separate research baskets.  
 
Otherwise a revised theory of SWB needs to satisfy the Lakatos (1970) criterion; that 
is, it should account in a reasonably parsimonious way for all the data satisfactorily 
accounted for by previous theory – set-point theory – plus the new discordant results 
which set-point theory fails to account for.  
 
There are several promising lines of theory which may be worth further development.  
Investigations based on the supposition that choice of life goals matters to SWB 
appear to offer one such line. It may be that, if a person can select life goals/priorities 
suited to his/her particular personality and skills, then improved SWB becomes a 
reasonably strong possibility. A capacity for persistence/perserverance in pursuit of 
goals may also make a substantial difference. This possibility is mentioned partly on 
the basis of finding that high ‘internal locus of control’, in addition to pursuit of non 
zero-sum goals, is linked to higher levels of SWB (see Table 3 above). 
 
It should be noted that the idea that choice of goals is linked to SWB is a central plank 
of the ‘authentic happiness’ school of thought (Seligman, 2002).  The idea that 
internal locus of control is a key trait linked to success in the pursuit of goals harks   20
back to Rotter’s (1966) work in this area, and also to more recent work suggesting 
that ‘personal control’ may be important for SWB (Peterson, 1999).   
 
Two other more general trends in research in individual psychology may blend in with 
new work on SWB.  There is now a considerable body of research which shows that 
quite large scale interventions (as distinct from one-on-one therapy) can be effective 
in enhancing overall SWB or specific aspects of well-being.  Evaluations of group 
training in marriage improvement and in parent effectiveness have yielded very 
positive results (Gottman, 1996; Sanders, 1996; for similar claims relating to SWB, 
see Fordyce, 1988).  
 
A second contribution from the broader field of personality psychology, which may 
be ripe for incorporation into SWB theory, relates to changes in personality during 
adulthood. There is some evidence that personality traits, rather than being immutable 
from adolescence onwards, can change quite a lot in young adulthood – before age 30 
– and that changes after that age are not extremely rare (Roberts, Walton and 
Viechtbauer, 2006).  One view (‘social investment theory’) is that committed 
investments in specific social roles (e.g. husband, wife, manager) may have a 
permanent effect in modifying personality traits (Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer, 
2006).  A recent paper by Scollon and Diener (2006) has indicated that changes in 
personality during adulthood can be linked to changes in SWB.  It may even be the 
case that there are positive feedback loops between gains in SWB and what might be 
termed ‘positive’ changes in personality (e.g. increased E and lower N).  
 
To conclude: this should be an exciting time in SWB research. The whole field may 
be opening up again. Set-point theory was of limited scope and stultifying in its 
implications. So we should probably stop strapping what Kuhn (1962) called 
‘protective belts’ on to the old theory and instead see if we can manufacture our own 
small ‘scientific revolution’.   
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